Skip to content

Contact

Mexico City, Mexico
Available for remote and on-site projects.

Professional networks

LinkedIn · GitHub · Email
Applied engineering, measurable results.

Black Friday: account theft in your store

· 9 min read · Samuel Torres

By Samuel Torres — Software & Cloud Engineer. 23+ production sites.

Part 1 covered card testing: bots using your checkout to try stolen cards. This part is about what comes next, and it never touches the payment gateway: bots logging into your customers' accounts with passwords leaked from other sites, redeeming coupons over and over, and abusing refunds. The fraud moves out of the payment form and into your store's rules.

Black Friday is Friday, November 27, and Cyber Monday is Monday, November 30. Here is what I would check in a WooCommerce store before then.

What the numbers say

Thales (Imperva), in its holiday-season post published November 26, 2025, reports a 283% increase in account takeover attacks on Black Friday 2024. The same post gives two 2025 figures for online retail: 64% of bot attacks on retail sites targeted business logic, and 39% of online retail traffic came from bad bots.

On the underground side, Flashpoint wrote on November 11, 2026 that underground discussions referencing Black Friday rose from 98 posts in October 2025 to 674 in November, and that more than 10,000 stolen payment cards were added to just 10 active carding shops over a single week (Flashpoint doesn't say which week). The same piece describes "refund fraud as a service": people paying an operator to get refunds they aren't owed.

"Business logic" means the bot doesn't break anything technical. It uses your store exactly as designed, just at scale: log in, apply a coupon, request a refund. Every step is valid; the volume and the pattern are what's wrong.

What to look for in the logs: logins

WooCommerce customers sign in in two places: /wp-login.php and the /my-account/ form (your store may use a different slug; check WooCommerce → Settings → Advanced). The Apache log gives you a useful hint: a failed login re-renders the form with a 200, and a successful one redirects with a 302.

#!/bin/bash
# cPanel account log (adjust user and domain)
LOG=/home/usuario/access-logs/tutienda.mx-ssl_log

# Failed logins (200) per IP
grep -E '"POST /(wp-login\.php|my-account/)' "$LOG" \
  | awk '$9==200 {print $1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head -10

# Login attempts per minute, all IPs combined
grep -E '"POST /(wp-login\.php|my-account/)' "$LOG" \
  | awk '{print substr($4,2,17)}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head -10

# xmlrpc.php also accepts a username and password
grep -c '"POST /xmlrpc.php' "$LOG"

How to read it:

  • One IP with hundreds of failures is classic brute force. Easy to block.
  • Many IPs with one or two attempts each, plus a per-minute spike is credential stuffing: email and password lists stolen elsewhere, spread across thousands of IPs. A per-IP limit barely sees it; the total spike does.
  • Failures followed by a 302 from the same IP is the moment that matters: the bot got in.

Two caveats. The /my-account/ form also handles registrations and profile edits, so not every POST there is a login. And if the store sits behind Cloudflare and the server doesn't restore the real client IP (mod_remoteip), you'll see Cloudflare's IPs, not the attackers'.

The Apache log doesn't include the username, because it's in the POST body. To see failures per user, Wordfence's Live Traffic records failed logins with the username tried. If one customer shows attempts from many IPs, that account is on a leaked list.

Login limits that don't punish your customers

Wordfence's brute force protection has options such as "Lock out after how many login failures", "Count failures over what time period" and the lockout duration. Its own documentation uses 20 failures in 5 minutes as an example. For a store, I would leave "Immediately lock out invalid usernames" off: your customers log in with their email, they mistype it, and that option locks out their IP on the first slip.

Be clear about the limit of this defense: it blocks by IP. Against credential stuffing spread over thousands of IPs it does little, which is why the next sections matter more.

If you confirm an account was taken over, kill its sessions and force a password change with WP-CLI:

cd /home/usuario/public_html
wp user session destroy usuario --all
wp user reset-password usuario

reset-password changes the password and emails the customer a link to set a new one.

2FA for customers with a balance or points

An empty account isn't worth much to an attacker. One with loyalty points, store credit, a saved card or purchase history is. That's where two-factor authentication pays off.

Since version 7.9.0, Wordfence lets WooCommerce customers turn on 2FA from their account page: enable "Show Wordfence 2FA menu on WooCommerce Account page" and, under "2FA Roles", set the Customer role to "Optional". Wordfence advises against making it required for customers, since some struggle to set it up. I'd follow that: optional for everyone, plus a clear note to customers who hold a balance or points asking them to turn it on. Afterwards, test the login and account pages on staging; a theme or plugin can clash with the form.

Coupons: rules a bot can't recycle

Part 1 already asked for a per-user limit and an expiry date. For Black Friday I'd go further. On each WooCommerce coupon (Marketing → Coupons), check:

  • Usage limit per user: WooCommerce counts it per account and, for guest checkout, per billing email. A bot generating fresh emails gets around it, so it isn't enough on its own.
  • Allowed emails: for make-good or VIP coupons, restrict the code to those customers' addresses.
  • Minimum spend and Exclude sale items: 20% off an already discounted product is where you lose the most.
  • Individual use only: no stacking with other coupons.
  • Usage limit per coupon and an expiry date on every public coupon.

To see at a glance how much each one has been used:

wp wc shop_coupon list --user=1 \
  --fields=id,code,amount,usage_count,usage_limit,usage_limit_per_user,date_expires \
  --format=table

A coupon with no usage_limit, no date_expires and a fast-climbing usage_count is the first one I'd pause.

In the log, applying a coupon shows up as /?wc-ajax=apply_coupon (classic checkout) or /wp-json/wc/store/v1/cart/apply-coupon (block checkout). Lots of code attempts from one IP means someone is guessing coupons:

grep -E '"POST /(\?wc-ajax=apply_coupon|wp-json/wc/store/v1/cart/apply-coupon)' "$LOG" \
  | awk '{print $1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head -10

Refunds: the part you review by hand

Refund abuse isn't a bot you can block by IP; it's a process. What you can do is see who concentrates refunds:

wp wc shop_order list --user=1 --status=refunded --per_page=100 \
  --field=customer_id | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr | head -10

Note that customer_id 0 means guest orders, and a partial refund doesn't move an order to "Refunded", so this list misses those. Rules I'd set for the season: refunds go back to the original payment method, never as credit to a different account; check the customer's history before approving; and when an item bought with points or a coupon comes back, refund what was actually paid.

The WooCommerce REST API

There are two different APIs, and both matter.

REST API keys (WooCommerce → Settings → Advanced → REST API) grant access to orders and customers. Check which keys exist, with what permission, and when they were last used:

wp db query "SELECT key_id, user_id, description, permissions, truncated_key, last_access FROM $(wp db prefix)woocommerce_api_keys"

A read_write key nobody recognizes, or one unused for months, gets revoked on that same screen.

The Store API (/wp-json/wc/store/v1/) is public on purpose: the block cart and checkout use it. WooCommerce ships a rate limit for it, off by default and enabled with a filter. It tracks logged-in users by user ID and guests by IP, and only limits POST requests. As a mu-plugin:

<?php
// wp-content/mu-plugins/limite-store-api.php
add_filter('woocommerce_store_api_rate_limit_options', function () {
    return [
        'enabled'       => true,
        'proxy_support' => true, // only if you're behind a proxy such as Cloudflare
        'limit'         => 25,
        'seconds'       => 10,
    ];
});

25 requests in 10 seconds is WooCommerce's default. proxy_support makes it read the client IP from the proxy header; with no proxy in front, keep it false, because that header can be spoofed. Back up and test on staging first: with the block cart, place a full order and apply a coupon to confirm a normal customer never hits the limit.

The real case

I don't have a documented account takeover case on the sites I run, and I won't invent one. What I do have is a way to roll these changes out: I run 23+ WordPress sites on AlmaLinux + WHM/cPanel, and I moved 61 domains to PHP 8.3 one at a time, with a backup and a rollback. I'd do the same here: logs first, then Wordfence and the Store API limit on one store, check it the next day, and only then move to the rest.

What I wouldn't do

  • I wouldn't make 2FA mandatory for every customer in peak season. Whatever you gain in security you lose in carts abandoned at the login form.
  • I wouldn't block IPs by hand, one at a time, against credential stuffing. There are thousands and they rotate; chase the pattern, not the IP.
  • I wouldn't leave public coupons without an expiry or a limit "because it's Black Friday". That's exactly when they get shared on forums.
  • I wouldn't auto-approve refunds during the busiest weeks.

Want to go through it together?

If you'd like someone to review your logs, coupons, API keys and login setup before November 27, that's part of the WordPress security audit I do for stores. If you'd rather have it checked every month, there's maintenance. Get in touch through contact.

Sources

  • 283% increase in account takeover attacks on Black Friday 2024; 64% of bot attacks on retail sites targeted business logic (2025); 39% of online retail traffic from bad bots (2025): Thales/Imperva, "How Thales Protects Online Retail Sites from AI-Driven Bots during Holiday Shopping Season", November 26, 2025 — imperva.com
  • Black Friday underground posts from 98 in October 2025 to 674 in November; more than 10,000 stolen cards added to 10 carding shops in one week; refund fraud as a service: Flashpoint, "Inside the Fraud Underground", November 11, 2026 — flashpoint.io
  • Wordfence 2FA for WooCommerce customers (7.9.0, Customer role set to "Optional") — wordfence.com
  • Wordfence brute force protection (example of 20 failures in 5 minutes) — wordfence.com
  • Store API rate limiting (filter, 25 requests in 10 seconds, POST only) — developer.woocommerce.com

About the author

Samuel Torres is a Software & Cloud Engineer at Conqr Digital Agency (Mexico City). He runs 23+ production WordPress sites and processed 80,000 documents with OCR + LLM. More at /en/about. Get a quote on WhatsApp in 2 min

Samuel Torres Pichardo

Samuel Torres Pichardo
Software and cloud engineer in Mexico City, with about 3 years of professional experience.
About me · LinkedIn · GitHub · Contact

Got a project in mind?

Hire me: I'll help you build it.

Websites, online stores, custom systems and cloud. Tell me what you need and I'll tell you how I'd build it, what it costs and how long it takes.

  • Mexico City · remote

Menu

Español

[email protected]